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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Monte George Hoffman appeals from the district court's order summarily
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief, contending the court improperly
took judicial notice of the underlying criminal record and erred in summarily
dismissing several of the claims alleged in his post-conviction petition.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Underlying Proceedings
The state charged Hoffman with, and he pied guilty to, possession of
methamphetamine in Bannock County Case No. CR-2008-206-FE. 1 (Supp. R.,
pp.24-25; R., pp.180-181.) Hoffman subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his
guilty plea, which he later withdrew, and the court imposed a unified six-year
sentence with two years fixed and retained jurisdiction. (Supp. R., pp.31-32, 3436.)

At the conclusion of the retained jurisdiction review period, the court

relinquished jurisdiction and ordered Hoffman's sentence executed. (Supp. R.,
pp.38-39.) Pursuant to a Rule 35 motion, the court reduced Hoffman's sentence
to a unified term of four years with two years fixed. (Supp. R., pp.41-42.)
Hoffman filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging
"illegal search and siezure [sic], illegal sentence, failure to provide discovery,
ineffective assistance of counsel from (4) different attornies [sic]."
(capitalization altered).)

(R., p.2

Hoffman also alleged (1) "counsel failed to produce

1

The state also charged Hoffman with a persistent violator enhancement (Supp.
R., pp.26-27), which was dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement (Tr., p.7, Ls.724, p.14, Ls.19-21 ).
1

discovery and file appeal," file a motion to suppress, file a motion to withdraw his
guilty plea, "persue [sic] any defenses that otherwise could have been available,"
"insure [sic] that [he] be allowed an opportunity of [sic] allocution" at his retained
jurisdiction review hearing or present evidence in his favor at that hearing, or
"negotiate the terms [he] asked for on a Rule 35 Motion;" (2) he was "threatened
or coerced into the plea of guilt and was wrongfully convicted for a possession
over a simply paraphenilia [sic] that was illegally searched and seized [sic] from a
vehicle that did not belong to [him]." (R., pp.2-3, 17-18 (capitalization altered).)
The district court granted Hoffman's request for the appointment of counsel to
represent him in his post-conviction case. (R., pp.51-54, 60-61.)
The state filed an answer and a motion for preparation of the transcript of
the Rule 35 hearing conducted in Hoffman's underlying criminal case, which
motion was granted. (R., pp.66-67, 78-81.)

Hoffman, through counsel, filed a

"Brief in Support of Post Conviction Relief and Response to State's Answer" in
which he reiterated Hoffman's claims and asserted "there are genuine issues of
material fact" entitling Hoffman to an evidentiary hearing.

(R., pp.84-90.)

Approximately three months later, the court issued a notice of intent to dismiss
("Notice").

(R., pp.92-117.)

In its Notice, the court indicated it had "carefully

reviewed the Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief, the Affidavit of
Facts in Support of Post Conviction Relief, the Brief in Support of Post Conviction
Relief, the Answer and the record in the underlying case." (R., p.94.) "Based
upon [its] examination of the entire record," the court advised Hoffman of its
intent to dismiss his petition, setting forth, in detail, the reasons for its intended
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dismissal of each claim.

(R., pp.94-117.)

The court's Notice gave Hoffman

twenty days in which to "allege[ ] facts sufficient to raise the possibility of a valid
claim, rather than bare, conclusory allegations."

(R., pp.116-117 (emphasis

original).)
Despite the fact that he was represented by counsel (pursuant to his
request for such), Hoffman filed a pro se motion for an extension of time to
respond to the court's Notice, which the court granted. (R., pp.122-123, 155.)
Ten days later, Hoffman filed a pro se "Modified Motion for Post Conviction
Relief, and Attatched [sic] Affidavit in Support." 2 (R., pp.124-130.) Hoffman also
filed a pro se "Memorandum in Support of Post Conviction Relief." (R., pp.138154.) The court thereafter entered an order dismissing Hoffman's petition. (R.,
pp.155-165.)

Hoffman, through counsel, filed a timely notice of appeal.

(R.,

pp.166-168.)

2

Although the title of the pleading Hoffman filed indicated there was an affidavit
attached, no separate affidavit was filed with the court. (See generally R.,
pp.124-154; see also pp.155-156.) The "Modified Motion" was, however,
notarized. (R., p.130.)
3

ISSUES
Hoffman states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court err when, in summarily dismissing Mr.
Hoffman's petition for post conviction relief, it improperly took
judicial notice of "the record in the underlying case?"

2.

Did the district court err when, in summarily dismissing Mr.
Hoffman's petition for post conviction relief, it failed to
consider the factual allegations made in Mr. Hoffman's
verified pleadings?

3.

Did the district court err when it summary dismissed Mr.
Hoffman's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel?

4.

Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Mr.
Hoffman's claim that his plea was not entered knowingly,
intelligently, or voluntarily because it was the result of
ineffective assistance of counsel?

(Appellant's Brief, p.12.)
The state rephrases the issues 3 on appeal as:
With the exception of his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a
suppression motion, has Hoffman failed to meet his burden of establishing he
raised a genuine issue of material fact that would entitle him to an evidentiary
hearing on any of his other claims?

3

In the state's view, Hoffman's first two issues on appeal are not distinct
substantive issues but are more akin to arguments that may be made in
response to the state's brief and/or in relation to whether summary dismissal of a
particular claim was appropriate.
The state will, therefore, only address
Hoffman's arguments regarding the scope of the district court's judicial notice
and whether his pleadings raise a genuine issue of material fact to the extent
they are relevant to a specific claim.
4

ARGUMENT
Hoffman Failed To Raise A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact That Would Entitle
Him To An Evidentiary Hearing On Any Claim Except His Claim That Counsel
Was Ineffective For Failing To File A Suppression Motion
A.

Introduction
Hoffman asserts the district court erred in summarily dismissing some of

his claims, arguing he raised "genuine issues of material fact" on a number of
claims that warranted an evidentiary hearing. (Appellant's Brief, pp.17-18, 52.)
With one exception, Hoffman is incorrect. A review of the record shows Hoffman
only raised a genuine issue of material fact on his claim that counsel was
ineffective for failing to file a suppression motion.

All of Hoffman's remaining

claims were properly dismissed without an evidentiary hearing.

B.

Standard Of Review
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any
affidavits on file." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803
(2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)).

5

C.

The State Concedes Hoffman Raised A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact
On His Claim That Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To File A
Suppression Motion
In his petition, Hoffman asserted that all four of his attorneys were

ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress. 4 (R., p.3.) The facts Hoffman
alleged in support of his claim that a motion to suppress would have been viable
include: (1) the traffic stop which culminated in the search was based on a nonfunctioning headlight, but Hoffman claims the headlight was working; (2) although
Hoffman was driving the vehicle that was searched, it did not belong to him; (3)
"[t]he search was conducted without consent by either [Hoffman] or the actual
owner of the vehicle;" (4) the "inventory search [sic] improperly conducted, as it
fell outside of the scope and procedures of an inventory search;" (5) the "search
was conducted for investigative reasons and not for inventory purposes;"(6) he
was "already detained prior to the search of the trunk and was only being
charged with several misdemenors [sic] prior to whatever was discovered in the
trunk;" and (6) "any evidence seized after [Hoffman] was detained should not of
[sic] been admissible evidence since it was not in [his] immediate reach." (R.,
pp.6-8; see also pp.10, 15-16, 20-21, 25-26 (capitalization altered).)

4

On appeal, however, Hoffman concedes that his fourth attorney could not be
ineffective for failing to do so because Hoffman did not retain him until after he
pied guilty. (Appellant's Brief, p.37; see R., p.36.) The state submits that this
allegation also does not apply to any attorney who represented Hoffman after the
deadline for filing a motion to suppress, particularly since Hoffman has failed to
articulate any "good cause" or "excusable neglect" that would have relieved him
of failing to comply with the filing deadline. I.C.R. 12(d). Nevertheless, because
Hoffman was represented by an attorney during the timeframe in which a
suppression motion could have been filed, the state will respond to the general
allegation that an attorney should have filed such a motion.
6

The court notified Hoffman of its intent to dismiss this claim on the ground
that it was a "conclusory allegation" unsupported by a "factual basis" or evidence.
(R., p.103.) The court also stated:
Furthermore, a petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding is not
allowed to raise any issue that could have been raised on a direct
appeal, but was not so raised, unless those issues were not known
and could not have reasonably been known at the time of the
appeal. ...
Just as importantly, Mr. Hoffman did not raise this issue at
the time he entered his guilty plea, at which time he waived all
claims he might have for violations of civil and constitutional rights.
A valid plea of guilty, voluntarily and understandingly [sic] given,
waives all non-jurisdictional defects and defenses, whether
constitutional or statutory. In the Guilty Questionnaire signed by
Mr. Hoffman, he agreed that he was waiving all constitutional rights
by pleading guilty and did not claim any violation of his
constitutional or civil rights.
(R., pp.103-104 (citations omitted).) The court also informed Hoffman that the
suppression claim was not "cognizable" in post-conviction because "a post
conviction proceeding is not the forum to make a claim regarding failure to
suppress evidence allegedly illegally seized." (R., p.104.)
In response to the court's Notice, Hoffman filed a memorandum, stating, in
part: "Absent consent, only exigency's [sic] such as fear of imminent destruction
of evidence, hot pursuit, and immediate threats to the safety of the public or
the officers can justify a warrantless search."

(R., p.144 (emphasis original).)

The court subsequently dismissed Hoffman's claim relating to the suppression
issue, reiterating its position that Hoffman failed to support his claims with
"competent and admissible evidence." (R., p.164.)
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On appeal, Hoffman asserts summary dismissal of his claim that his
attorneys were ineffective for failing to file a suppression motion was error
because, he argues: (1) his "unrebutted factual assertions [when] taken as true"
demonstrate the traffic stop and search of his car violated the Fourth
Amendment; (2) he could not have raised the claim on direct appeal; and (3) he
waived his suppression claim by pleading guilty. (Appellant's Brief, pp.37-45.)
The state concedes that Hoffman could not have raised his ineffective assistance
of counsel claim on direct appeal and did not waive the claim by pleading guilty.
Consequently, dismissal on either basis would be improper.
The state also concedes that, pursuant to Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho
148, 177 P.3d 362 (2008), Hoffman raised a genuine issue of material fact that
would entitle him to an evidentiary hearing on whether there was reasonable
articulable suspicion to support the traffic stop. 5

5

In Baldwin, the petitioner

The state does not, however, concede that Hoffman raised a genuine issue of
material fact that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress
based on the search of the vehicle. Hoffman essentially asserted two grounds in
support of this claim: (1) the car he was driving was not his and neither he nor
the owner consented to the search, and (2) he was detained at the time of the
search such that the car was not within his reach. (R., pp.6-8, 0, 15-16, 20-21,
25-26.) Neither ground would support a motion to suppress. With respectto the
first ground, if the car did not belong to Hoffman, as he contends, he would not
have standing to challenge the search of the car. See State v. Bordeaux, 148
Idaho 1, 9, 217 P.3d 1, 9 (Ct. App. 2009) ("Generally, only the owner of a vehicle
has standing to directly challenge an illegal search.
Idaho courts have
consistently held that a passenger in a vehicle subject to an allegedly illegal
search generally does not have standing to object to the search of the car. A
passenger who has no proprietary interest in the vehicle lacks a reasonable
expectation of privacy, and therefore, standing to challenge a search where the
driver has consented."). With respect to the second ground, this argument is
based upon the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Arizona v. Gant, 556
U.S. 332 (2009). Hoffman could not have based a motion to suppress on Gant,
8

alleged, in relevant part, that his attorney was ineffective for failing to "file a
motion to suppress what he allege[d] was illegally seized heroin." 145 Idaho at
155, 177 P .3d at 369.

The district court summarily dismissed the claim

reasoning that the evidence was properly seized based on the plain view
exception or, alternatively, the stop and frisk exception. !sl The Idaho Supreme
Court reversed, finding that this conclusion was correct only if the court accepted
the detectives' account as true, which account was obtained from the detectives'
report.

Id.

Because the district court was required to accept Baldwin's

allegations as true, and because Baldwin alleged facts demonstrating the
evidence was not seized pursuant to either exception, there was a genuine issue
of material fact that entitled Baldwin to an evidentiary hearing to present
evidence in support of his allegations. !slat 155-156, 177 P.3d at 369-370.
Similarly, Hoffman alleged that, contrary to the officer's claim that his
headlight was not functioning, which was the basis for the traffic stop, "both
headlights were in working order."

(R., p.6 (capitalization altered).)

Hoffman,

therefore, alleged a genuine issue of material fact that would entitle him to an
evidentiary hearing on whether the initiation of the traffic stop complied with the
Fourth Amendment.

D.

Hoffman Has Failed To Establish He Was Entitled To An Evidentiary
Hearing On Any Of His Remaining Claims
Hoffman argues the district court erred in summarily dismissing his claims

that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a request for discovery and

however, because Gant was not decided until April 21, 2009, approximately six
months after judgment was entered in his case.
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"adequately consult" with him about filing an appeal. (Appellant's Brief, pp.2151.) Hoffman further asserts that the district court erred in summarily dismissing
his claim that his plea was invalid due to "counsels' failure to request discovery,
failure to file a motion to suppress, and failure to inform him of, or to pursue,
defenses to the charge."

(Appellant's Brief, p.52.)

Hoffman has failed to

establish error in the summary dismissal of these claims because a review of the
pleadings reveals the claims are either waived or Hoffman failed to raise a
genuine issue of material fact that would warrant a hearing.
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for
post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own
initiative.

"To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must

present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace,
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581,
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, when a post-conviction petitioner alleges
ineffective assistance of counsel, in order to suNive summary dismissal of his
petition, he must specifically allege that "(1) a material issue of fact exists as to
whether counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) a material issue of fact
exists as to whether the deficiency prejudiced the applicant's case." Baldwin v.
State, 145 Idaho 148, 153-54, 177 P.3d 362, 367-68 (2008) (internal citations
omitted).

"To establish deficient assistance, the burden is on the petitioner to

show that his

attorney's

conduct fell

reasonableness.

This objective standard embraces a strong presumption that

10

below an

objective standard of

trial counsel was competent and diligent."

J.sL

"[S]trategic or tactical decisions

will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on
inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable
of objective evaluation."

J.sL

"To establish prejudice, the claimant must show a

reasonable probability that but for his attorney's deficient performance the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different."

1.

lst.

Hoffman Failed To Raise A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact That
Counsel Were Ineffective With Respect To Discovery

Several different attorneys represented Hoffman during the course of his
underlying criminal case.

(See R., pp.3, 36, 42-43.)

In his petition, and

throughout his pleadings, Hoffman asserted all of his attorneys were ineffective
for failing to provide him with discovery. (R., pp.2, 3, 10, 12, 13, 1, 16, 20, 26,
29, 127-128, 140.)

In his brief filed in support of his petition, Hoffman also

asserted counsel "failed to file and review discovery" with him.

(R., p.87.)

According to Hoffman, he was prejudiced by counsels' failure to do so because
discovery would have revealed "obvious" defenses that could have been
pursued. (R., p.15.) Specifically, Hoffman asserted discovery would have shown
"that the paraphenillia [sic] that was supposedly found in the trunk of a vehicle"
was not on his "'person,' 'nexus,' or in his 'possession."' (R., p.15.)
In its Notice, the district court concluded summary dismissal of t~1is claim
was appropriate because "the record shows that a Request for Discovery was
filed on March 13, 2008." (R., p.102.) The court further stated:
[Hoffman] supplies no additional facts that would reasonably merit
further investigation, nor does he provide evidence of any discovery
11

that his attorney(s) failed to complete. Furthermore, [Hoffman] did
not offer any specifics regarding his contention that his counsel did
not review the evidence with him. Even accepting as true that his
attorney(s) did not provide him with materials or discuss the case,
[Hoffman] presents no evidence, or even an allegation, about how
further discussions with his attorney would have changed the
outcome of his case.
(R., p.102.) Thus, the court concluded, Hoffman failed to satisfy "his burden of

demonstrating that his counsel's conduct was deficient . . . and that he was
prejudiced as a result of any deficient conduct." (R., p.102.)
The district court revisited Hoffman's claim that counsel denied him
discovery in its final order of dismissal (R., p.161 ), noting Hoffman's arguments in
response to the Notice wherein Hoffman essentially reiterated his allegation that
none of his attorneys provided him with "required discovery" (R., pp.127-128).
On appeal, Hoffman correctly notes that the request for discovery filed on
March 13, 2008, and referred to by the district in its Notice was a request filed by
the prosecutor, not by defense counsel. (Appellant's Brief, p.24; see R., pp.177179 (state's discovery request).)

The state agrees that the discovery request

filed by the prosecutor is not relevant to Hoffman's claim his attorneys were
ineffective for failing to request discovery and/or provide discovery to him.
(Appellant's Brief, p.24.) The court's erroneous reliance on the state's discovery
request does not, however, mean that Hoffman satisfied his burden of alleging a
prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel for allegedly failing to obtain
or share discovery with Hoffman.
As to the claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to request discovery,
Hoffman failed to allege any basis for concluding he actually had personal
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knowledge regarding any of his attorney's efforts to obtain discovery.

He

apparently just assumes they did not based on his assertion that counsel never
provided discovery to him. Hoffman's assumptions about what counsel did or did
not do are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Workman v.
State, 144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007) ("an application for postconviction relief .must be verified with respect to facts within the personal
knowledge of the applicant"); see Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651
P.2d 546, 551 (1982) (factual showing in a post-conviction relief application must
be in the form of evidence that would be admissible at an evidentiary hearing).
Hoffman's claim that none of his attorneys provided him with discovery is
contradicted by the record. A letter submitted by Hoffman indicates that at least
one of his attorneys provided him with the police reports. (R., p.36 (letter from
counsel indicating he was "enclosing all of the police reports that were provided
to [him] by the Bannock County Prosecutor's office").) While a district court is
required to accept unrebutted allegations as true, allegations that are "clearly
disproved by the record of the original proceedings" are insufficient. Workman,
144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802. Moreover, the district court was not required
to accept Hoffman's legal conclusion, i.e., that he was prejudiced as a result of
his counsels' alleged deficiencies.

~

Even if the information in the record is not adequate to disprove Hoffman's
claim that none of his attorneys ever provided discovery, the mere failure to
provide discovery does not establish prejudice. Rather, Hoffman had the burden
of alleging a genuine issue of material fact that the discovery would have
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contained information that would have allowed him to pursue a defense that he
could not have pursued absent the discovery. (See R., p.15 (Hoffman's claim of
prejudice is that discovery would have revealed "obvious" defenses that could
have been pursued).) Hoffman seems to claim that he satisfied his burden of
showing this specific prejudice because he "asserted facts which would have
resulted in the suppression of evidence of possession of a controlled substance."
(Appellant's Brief, p.30; see also pp.31-33.)

Hoffman also argues that "[h]ad

counsel not performed deficiently, counsel would have discovered evidence that
police found the paraphernalia with methamphetamine residue in the trunk of a
car and [sic] that [he] did not own, but was merely driving." (Appellant's Brief,
p.34.) Hoffman claims "[t]his coupled with [his] lack of prior knowledge of the
item, and the fact that he was only test driving the car for fifteen minutes before
the stop occurred established a reasonable defense to the charge of possession
of a controlled substance." 6

(Appellant's Brief, p.34.)

This claim of prejudice

lacks merit.

6

Hoffman also asserts that the district court applied an incorrect legal standard
to his claim of prejudice based upon the language in the dismissal order where
the court states Hoffman failed to "demonstrate prejudice, as he offered no
evidence that the outcome of his case would have been different but for his
attorneys' unprofessional errors." (Appellant's Brief, p.29; R., p.164.) Hoffman
notes that the correct standard is not whether the result "would have been
different" but whether there is a reasonable probability that it would have been
different. (Appellant's Brief, p.29.) While the court did not use the exact
language from Strickland in its conclusion regarding Hoffman's failure to
sufficiently allege prejudice, the court's Notice demonstrates the court was aware
of the applicable legal standard. (R., p.100.) The court's imprecise restatement
of the standard does not demonstrate the court actually applied the incorrect
standard or otherwise establish a basis for reversal.
14

Exactly how Hoffman's factual assertions relating to the circumstances
surrounding his arrest and subsequent search demonstrate prejudice arising
from the alleged failure to share discovery with him is unclear.

Hoffman was

obviously aware of these facts regardless of discovery and could have shared his
version of events with counsel. Indeed, Hoffman claimed in his Affidavit of Facts
that had his attorney "listened to [his] claims of innocence and [sic] that [he] had
just picked up the vehicle not fifteen minutes after someone else was driving the
vehicle, th[e]n [counsel] could have had his case overturned on lack of evidence."
(R., pp.15-16.) Even if counsel failed to share any discovery with Hoffman, he

failed to allege how "discovery" would have supported his claimed defense such
that the failure to share discovery prejudiced his ability to pursue a defense.
Hoffman attempts to overcome this fatal flaw by arguing that he should be
excused from his burden of providing actual evidence to support his claims
because he "recited why the necessary documents were not attached."
(Appellant's Brief, p.36.) Specifically, Hoffman relies on his claims to the district
court that he never received discovery in his criminal case and post-conviction
counsel did not assist him in obtaining that discovery. (Appellant's Brief, pp.3536.) Hoffman also appears to argue that the district court should have ordered
discovery in his post-conviction case based on his claims that the discovery from
his criminal case had never been provided. (See Appellant's Brief, p.36 (arguing
summary dismissal is not appropriate under I.C. § 19-4906(b) because further
proceedings addressing his "renewed request for counsel and conducting
discovery ... would serve the purpose of providing [him] with the documents he
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asserted would support his claims").)

These arguments fail for at least two

reasons.
First, as previously noted, the record disproves Hoffman's claim that none
of his defense attorneys ever provided him with discovery. (R., p.36.) It also
disproves any claim that, at a minimum, the attorney who represented him at his
change of plea did not discuss potential defenses with him. (7/7/08 Tr., p.11,
L.23-p.12, L.1.)
Second, to the extent Hoffman wanted to seek discovery through his postconviction case, he should have filed a motion requesting leave to do so; he did
not. Hoffman should not be permitted to predicate error on the district court's
failure to order discovery in this case when he never filed a discovery motion
requesting such.

Moreover, it is unlikely a request for discovery would be

granted based on Hoffman's speculative belief that the documents he seeks
would support his claims; such speculation is inadequate to engage in discovery
in post-conviction.

Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602, 21 P.3d 924 (2001);

Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 148, 139 P.3d 741, 750 (Ct. App. 2006)
('"Fishing expedition' discovery should not be allowed. The UPCPA provides a
forum for known grievances, not an opportunity to research for grievances.").
Because Hoffman failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact
related to his claim that counsel were ineffective for failing to "produce"
discovery, he has failed to show error in the district court's summary dismissal of
this claim.
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2.

Hoffman Failed To Raise A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact That
Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To File An Appeal

Hoffman alleged in his petition that his attorney was ineffective for failing
to file an appeal "of the original sentence," which Hoffman claims he asked
counsel to do "through letters" and "family members calling." (R., pp.3, 18.) The
district court correctly concluded Hoffman was not entitled to a hearing on this
claim because it was disproved by the record.
The court entered judgment in Hoffman's underlying criminal case on
October 20, 2008, at which time the court retained jurisdiction. (Supp. R., pp.3436.) The court relinquished jurisdiction on March 12, 2009. (Supp. R., pp.38-39.)
Hoffman was, therefore, required to file his notice of appeal no later than April 23,
2009. I.AR. 14(a).
The attorney who represented Hoffman at sentencing sent Hoffman a
letter dated October 23, 2008, three days after judgment was entered, advising
him:
[l]f you are dissatisfied with the judgment entered by the
court [in this case], you have the right to appeal the judgment. The
time by which you must file your appeal is 42 days from the date of
conviction. Should you wish to file a Notice of Appeal, you must
notify my office immediately with grounds that are appealable.
An appeal must be based upon legal grounds such as
ineffective assistance of counsel, a decision in which the judge
abuses discretion, or an evidentiary question that was not properly
ruled upon (this is not a complete list of reasons to appeal, but are
only given as examples). I do not see a reason to appeal or I
would have discussed it with you already.

If you choose to exercise your right to appeal or file a Rule
35 Motion but fail to do so within the time limits listed above, you
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will lose your right to exercise those rights. If you want to exercise
either of these rights, even though I have advised against this
action at this time, or have any questions, please contact my office.
(R., pp.37-38 (emphasis original).)
Hoffman attached the foregoing letter to his petition and included a
handwritten note at the bottom, which reads: "I tried to contact [counsel] after
receiving this so that I could file an apeal [sic] and a Rule 35."

(R., p.37

(capitalization altered).) Although Hoffman alleged in his petition that he actually
asked counsel to file an appeal "through letters" and "family members calling"
(R., p.18), the documents he offered in support of his claim do not support his
allegation.

Indeed, the handwritten note on the October 23, 2008 letter from

counsel makes clear that Hoffman never actually asked counsel to file a direct
appeal; rather, he only "tried to contact [counsel]" to ask him to do so.

This

handwritten assertion is consistent with the other documents Hoffman attached
to his petition.

Specifically, Hoffman provided a handwritten list of dates on

which he purportedly attempted to contact counsel,
presumably of 2009.

(R.,

p.41.)

beginning

May 15,

This list further indicates that after

unsuccessfully attempting to reach counsel on the phone, Hoffman sent a letter
on May 27.

(R., p.41.)

This is consistent with a copy of a letter Hoffman

submitted dated May 26, 2009.

(R., p.33.)

That letter, however, makes it

apparent that Hoffman's efforts to contact counsel starting May 15, 2009, had
nothing to do with Hoffman's desire to file an appeal. Hoffman's May 26, 2009
letter instead reflects Hoffman's desire to obtain information to support his postconviction petition. (R., p.33.) Hoffman also submitted a copy of a second letter
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dated June 20, 2009, which references the May 26 letter, complains of counsel's
failure to respond, and repeats the same requests made in his May 15 letter, i.e.,
for documents and information to support his post-conviction claims.
The only evidence Hoffman submitted in support of his claim that he also
had family members call is a letter written by his mother wherein she indicates
that she and her granddaughter tried to contact Hoffman's attorney. (R., p.35.)
However, that letter, which is dated August 3, 2009, also appears to relate only to
Hoffman's efforts pertaining to his post-conviction case, and says nothing of
Hoffman's desire to file an appeal.

(R., p.35.)

Moreover, that letter is not

addressed to Hoffman's attorney, but seems to be a document prepared only for
the purpose of suppo1iing Hoffman's post-conviction petition as it relates her
efforts, and her granddaughter's efforts, to contact counsel, and is notarized as
one would expect an affidavit in support of a petition to be. (R., p.35.)
In summarily dismissing Hoffman's claim that counsel was ineffective for
failing to file a direct appeal, the district court found that Hoffman's allegation was
disproved by the record. (R., p.105.) Specifically, the court references the letters
Hoffman attached to his petition in support of his claim, which included the May
26 and June 20 letters he wrote, the letter written by Hoffman's mother, and the
two letters he received from his attorney, and correctly notes that none of the
letters support Hoffman's claim that he actually asked counsel to file an appeal.
(R., pp.105-106.)
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On appeal, Hoffman argues the "district court incorrectly determined that
[tl"lis] claim was disproved by the record." (Appellant's Brief, p.46.) Specifically,
Hoffman asserts:
Although [he] attach[ed] copies of the letters he had sent to
[counsel], after the time to appeal had expired, which did not
include specific requests that an appeal be filed, he did not assert
that this was the only contact he had with [counsel], and it was not
the sum total of the facts alleged.
[His] verified pleadings
additionally asserted that, [he] "specifically asked/requested
[counsel] to file a Direct appeal of the original sentence through
letters, family members calling." (R., p.18 [capitalization original].)
(Appellant's Brief, p.46.)
This argument should be rejected because it requires the Court to ignore
the very evidence Hoffman offered in support of his claim and consider only the
first half of the allegation - that Hoffman asked counsel to file a direct appeal.
Hoffman also argues that "[e]ven if [he] had not specifically requested that
[counsel] file a notice of appeal," because counsel's advice "regarding his
appellate rights was patently incorrect," counsel was ineffective because he did
not "adequately consult with [him] regarding the filing of an appeal." (Appellant's
Brief, p.47.) This Court should reject this claim because it is being raised for the
first time on appeal. "Idaho Code section 19-4903 mandates that the application
for post-conviction relief 'specifically set forth the grounds upon which the
application is based . . ..

All grounds for relief ... must be raised in [the

defendant's] original, supplemental, or amended application.' I.C. § 19-4908."
Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56, 106 P.3d 376, 382 (2004) (emphasis added,
alteration original).

Claims not raised in Hoffman's application should not be

considered for the first time on appeal. Dunlap, 141 Idaho at 56-58, 106 P.3d at
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382-84. Nowhere in his petition did Hoffman assert a claim that his counsel was
ineffective for failing to adequately advise him regarding his appellate rights.

7

Any such claim is, therefore, not preserved for appeal and this Court should not
consider it.

3.

Hoffman Failed To Raise A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact That
His Guilty Plea Was Invalid

In his petition, Hoffman alleged that he was "threatened or coerced into
the plea of guilt" and that he "merely plead [sic] guilty after being threatened with
the peristant [sic] violator and coercion from appointed counsel and state
prosecutor."

(R., p.2 (capitalization altered).)

In addition to his claims that

counsel was ineffective in relation to discovery and in failing to file a motion to
suppress, Hoffman also alleged in his petition that counsel was ineffective for
failing to pursue any defenses. (R., p.3.) Post-conviction counsel restated these
particular claims as follows:
In the matter at hand, the Petitioner, Monte G. Hoffman,
contends he is entitled to post conviction relief because there are
genuine issues of material fact which support his allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel; that is, he is alleging that (1) his
former counsel failed to adequately investigate the facts, witnesses
and circumstances of the case, failed to file a motion to suppress
as there was an illegal seizure and search; failed to file and review
discovery with the Petitioner; failed to review any defenses with the
Petitioner; failed to timely file an appeal; thus, was [sic] ineffective
7

Although Hoffman argued in the memorandum filed in support of his "Modified
Motion for Post Conviction" that "[c]ounsel failed to consult with [~1im] on appeal
options and failed or refused to file said appeal" (R., p.143), this argument does
not constitute a claim that must be alleged in the petition. Furthermore, Hoffman
did not allege any facts to support such a claim. While all of Hoffman's
arguments on appeal in support of this "claim" are based on information
contained in the record, that information was not presented as facts in support of
any claim that counsel did not adequately advise him of ~lis appellate rights.
21

assistance of counsel; (2) that the Petitioner was threatened and
coerced into pleading guilty by former counsel and the state
prosecutor in that he would be sentenced as a persistent violator if
he did not accept the plea agreement; (3) that his decision to enter
the guilty plea was made under duress; thus, the guilty plea was
not made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently[.]
(R., p.87.)

The district court notified Hoffman of its intent to dismiss each of these
claims and the reasons for dismissal (see generally R., pp.101-113) and
subsequently dismissed the claims (R., pp.155-165).
On appeal, Hoffman lumps all of the foregoing claims together in support
of an argument that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his "claim"
that his plea was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary. (Appellant's Brief, p.52.)
Hoffman also complains that the district court "interpreted [his] claims regarding
the failure to pursue or inform him of defenses as merely an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim."

(Appellant's Brief, p.52.) The district court

addressed Hoffman's claims as they were presented to him. This Court should
reject both of the foregoing complaints because they are predicated on recharacterizing the claims as they were presented to the district court.
Hoffman also complains "that the district court erred when it relied upon
the records of the taking of his guilty plea, to the exclusion of other evidence
regarding the circumstances of the entry of the plea, to determine that the plea
was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered." (Appellant's Brief, p.53.)
While it is true, as Hoffman notes, that the district court referred to the change of
plea hearing and the guilty plea questionnaire in dismissing Hoffman's claims
that his counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue any possible defenses (R.,
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pp.106-108) and his claim that his plea was coerced (R., pp.109-112), it is
unclear what other evidence Hoffman believes the court should have considered
in relation to these specific claims. Hoffman merely contends the court limited its
consideration "to the record of the taking of the plea, to the exclusion of other
evidence in the post conviction record regarding the circumstances of the entry of
the plea." (Appellant's Brief, p.55.) To the extent Hoffman believes the district
court should have considered his other complaints about counsel that were
alleged as the basis for different claims in addition to the specific factual
allegations offered in support of his claim that his plea was coerced and that
counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue any possible defenses, no such
burden exists for the district court.

See Esser Elec. V. Lost River Ballistics

Technologies, Inc., 145 Idaho 912, 188 P.3d 854 (2008) ("the trial court is not
required to search the record looking for evidence that may create a genuine
issue of material fact; the party opposing the summary judgment is required to
bring that evidence to the court's attention").
Having failed to show how the district court erred in summarily dismissing
any claim that was actually alleged in the petition, other than the claim that
counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress, Hoffman has failed
to demonstrate he is entitled to remand for an evidentiary hearing on any claim
other than the one conceded by the state.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's order
dismissing Hoffman's petition for post-conviction relief in all respects with the
exception of the court's dismissal of Hoffman's claim that counsel was ineffective
for failing to file a motion to suppress.
DATED this 24 th day of October, 2011.
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